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Writer's pictureJan Dehn

Algerian Path Dependence

Updated: Oct 2


A happy woman walks through the Casbah in Algiers (Source: Own photo)


My recent visit to Algeria was a surprisingly positive experience. Algeria gets a bad press for reasons that – having been there – are no longer quite as obvious to me as they were before my visit, at least as far as ordinary Algerians are concerned. In my many travels to the Middle East, I have always found Arabs to be loyal, welcoming, and generous people.

 

I was surprised by the level of economic development. Algeria is now classified as an upper-middle income country, which puts it in the same category as Turkey, China, Brazil, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan (see here).


Algiers is an impressive capital reminiscent of Marseille, with a big sweeping bay and grand old French villas in white lining the promenade.


Beyond Algiers, the hinterland of Algeria is truly vast, extremely varied, and very beautiful with a rich cultural heritage, including the largest number of Roman ruins outside of Italy.


While Algeria undoubtedly has serious problems - many of which I will describe in this post - the geography, culture, and ordinary people, who I found to be easy-going, friendly, and family-oriented, are not among them.

Algiers is a beautiful city on the Mediterranean coast (Source: Own photos)


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Algeria’s real problem is its political and economic elites. Financed by oil and maintaining close ties to the military and the ruling party, they profit from and sustain an authoritarian, untouchable, and corrupt crony system of government. They deliberately keep alive the awful legacy of France’s colonial rule to justify an excessive degree of state control, including keeping the Algerian population isolated from the outside world.

 

Having said that, the fact that Algeria is a closed country has distinct advantages for the tourist. Granted, you are forced to go through an elaborate and time-consuming visa application process before you visit, but it is worth remembering it is far harder for Algerians to visit Europe than the other way around.


When you stroll around Algiers, you soon find there are no tourists. This is an odd, but delightful discovery! No one accosts you. No one charges you more for goods and services just because you are foreign. You are not even expected to tip. The guides are surprisingly personable and earnest and as curious about you as you are about them. There is no elaborate infrastructure of souvenir shops and themed restaurants designed to hype up the country’s attractions. You get what the locals get. You are invisible, a rare experience for travellers in this age.

 

In short, I went to Algeria and liked it!


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Still, as is my wont, I write about history, politics, culture, and economics and this note is no different. One of the things you notice immediately after arriving in Algeria are the many murals, street names, and official monuments named after martyr’s of France’s harrowing 132-year rule over Algeria. So much of what happened under French rule is deliberately kept fresh in the minds of Algerians and it explains much of what goes on in current politics and economics. Hence, the reference to path dependence in the title.


I will explain how past and present link up in Algeria, starting with a review of Algeria’s colonial history and then outlining the key characteristics of Algeria’s present-say political system. As you will find, the latter owes a great deal to the former.

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Amazigh, Mozabite and Tuarega peoples lived in the area we today call Algeria dating back at least 10,000 years. Collectively, they are given the name “Berbers”, or barbarians, by the Romans to denote that they do not speak Latin.

 

Between 600 BCE to 700 CE, Algeria experiences waves of immigration – some peaceful, some violent. The Phoenicians dominate the area until the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE after which the Romans take over as rulers. In 429 CE, Vandals of Scandinavian origin invade Algeria. They are followed by Byzantine Greeks a hundred years later.


The Arabs arrive in 647 CE led by Oqba Ibn-Nafaa, who incorporates Algeria into the Damascus-based Umayyad Caliphate. The Moors, as Europeans like to call Muslims from North Africa, remain the dominant culture in Algeria until the Spanish Reconquista of 1492. Buoyed by its success in excommunicating the erstwhile Muslim rulers of Spain, the Spanish crown threatens repeatedly to invade Algeria until 1516, when the Ottoman Sultan of Istanbul steps in to offer protection.


Ottoman involvement marks the start of the so-called Regency of Algiers, which is a quasi-independent Ottoman tributary state, which makes a living from slave trade and piracy. Algeria, at this point, is a series of quite similar fiefdoms without central overall control. Spain’s last invasion attempt occurs in 1775, ending in total failure.


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The French prove far better at invading Algeria than the Spanish. In 1830, they enter the country and set about systematically eradicating the Algerian fiefdoms. Emir Abdelkader emerges as an early Algerian hero, who, unusually, manages to unify a large number of Arab and Amazigh groups against the French. Nevertheless, French hegemony is inevtable on account of France’s superior weaponry and resources.

 

From the beginning, French involvement in Algeria is characterised – and soon becomes defined - by unbelievable cruelty. In the southern Hoggar Mountains, whole communities of people and livestock seek refuge in caves to escape the French. The French barricade the cave entrances and light big fires to asphyxiate the villagers inside. Those who try to escape are shot, killed with swords, or pushed into the flames.

 

One description reads:

 

“On all sides the ground of the gallery was littered with corpses of men, women and children tangled with those of the herds. These wretched people had been pushed back by fire, by baked plaster caving in, by bullets of our infantrymen and by the shrapnel of our shells. Therefore they had taken refuge in the deepest part of the cave, face down, in search of a little fresh air to delay the fatal moment”


 Another reads:

 

“To see in the middle of a moon lit night a unit of French troops busy keeping an infernal fire burning. Hearing the muffled groaning of men, women, children and animals, and the cracking of burned rocks collapsing. In the morning when we tried to clear the entrance of the caverns, we found bullocks, donkeys, and sheep lying…Piled up beneath the animals we found men, women and children. I saw a dead man on his knees with his hand clenched on a bullock’s horn. In front of him there was a woman holding her child in her arms. The man had suffocated in trying to protect his family from the rage of that animal. We counted 760 dead bodies.”  


The two quotes are from here, pages 1040 and 1042, respectively). There are countless such atrocities. They are repeated over and over across Algeria for a period lasting seventy years.


By 1903, when France finally manages to gain full control of Algeria upwards of a million Algerians have been killed through a combination of warfare to crush revolts, disease, and starvation.

 

The death toll is made worse by important and deeply discriminatory pieces of legislation introduced by the French in this period. On 4 November 1848, France approves the new constitution of the Second French Republic, which formally annexes Algeria as an integral part of France. A total of one million French men and women (equivalent to 13% of Algeria’s then population) immigrate to Algeria to start new lives. Known as ‘Pied Noirs’ or ‘colons’, these French-Algerians, who will eventually make up the majorities of the populations of the major cities of Oran and Algiers will play a crucial role in the independence war.

 

Despite Algeria’s formal inclusion in France, not all Algerians get to call themselves French. While Jewish Algerians are given full French citizen rights, Muslim Algerians, who make up the vast majority of the population, are made second-rate citizens in their own country.

 

In 1871, France approves the Indigenous People’s Law, which gives the French powers to expel Algerians from good arable land and force them into arid and mountainous regions. Trade, manufacturing, and mining are placed under French control and higher taxes are imposed on the Algerians than on the French in order to force Algerians to work on French farms and in French mines.


Algerians may become French, but only if they speak French and only if they renounce their own culture, which, incidentally, is a policy not dissimilar to current immigrants policies in many European countries. France also suppresses education of Algerians, while refusing to assign non-menial jobs to anyone who does not speak French. In short, the Indigenous People Law introduces de facto Apartheid in Algeria.

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After 1903, a quieter period ensues, because all opposition to French rule has effectively been crushed. In World War I, however, many young Algerians fight for France. They learn to speak French and upon their return begin to form civil organisations, such as student movements, political parties, and pro-Islamic groups in order to advocate for Algerian rights.


During World War II, even more Algerians fight for France, this time with the Free French under Charles de Gaulle. When the Algerian soldiers return home they fail to see why, having defeated tyranny in Europe, they should accept it at home. As in colonies elsewhere at this time, calls for independence grow louder.

 

Then, on 8 May 1945, the day of German capitulation, spontaneous celebrations break out across Algeria. The celebrations soon morph into protests against French rule, with calls for independence. In two northern towns called Setif and Guelma, French police open fire on the revellers, who, angered by police aggression, riot and kill 102 French-Algerians over the course of a couple of days.

 

The French colonial authorities respond with extreme violence. They undertake summary executions, bomb whole villages, and shell population centres from French navy vessels at anchor in the Mediterranean. Colons are given permission to enter prisons to lynch Algerian prisoners. The police does nothing to stop the violence. Estimates of the number of Algerians killed range from 6,000 to 45,000 with most estimates sitting around 20,000-30,000 dead. The vast majority of victims never participated in the protests.

 

The Setif and Guelma massacres increase the support for Algerian independence. In 1947, France attempts to dampen the demands for independence by offering French citizenship to Muslim Algerians, but Algerians want self-determination, which France flatly refuses to grant.

 

By this time, Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) has emerged as the most powerful of several organisations pushing for Algerian independence. Inspired by France’s determination to shove Catholicism down the throats of Algerians, FLN realises it too can exploit religion for political ends. FLN calls for democracy and social justice, but specifically along Islamic principles in order to draw a clear distinction between Muslim Algerians and the Catholic French. This shift in policy marks one of several critical turning points in the independence struggle, because from here onwards religious differences become politicised. And, as always when religion is involved, barbarism reaches new extremes (for more on the political usefulness of religion and other superstitions, see here).

 

Meanwhile, the world outside of Algeria is also changing at this time. By the mid-1950s, France is losing control in its colonial possessions in Indochina, Tunisia, and Morocco. The ideological divide between the West and the Soviet Union is also deepening, with Russia offering support for Algerian independence. By contrast, the US opts not to support France, because it believes Algerian independence is an inevitability.

 

France, of course, does not see it that way. There are too many French people living in Algeria for France to turn its back on the country. The French government is also too heavily invested in terms of political commitments to be able to leave. Above all, France wants to maintain its control over Algerian oil.

 

Without a way to reconcile the French and pro-independence positions, Algeria descends into war starting in November of 1954. At first, the fighting is moderate with sporadic FLN attacks on government and military installations in rural Algeria. France does not regard FLN as a serious military threat and only sends a few troops, while the main focus is on winning hearts and minds with infrastructure investments, education, jobs etc.

 

Then, suddenly, a wake-up call.

 

In 1955, FLN launches a large-scale attack on the town of Philippeville (today’s port of Skikda). Moreover, for the first time in the war FLN deliberately targets the French population and Algerians working for the French. The attack is therefore a major escalation even if it is not particularly successful in military terms.


Some 1,200 Algerians are killed in subsequent French-Algerian reprisals, again with the French police doing nothing to intervene to stop the atrocities.

 

Philippeville is an important turning point in the independence war, whose real significance is that it drives a deep wedge between those who want Algeria to remain an integral part of France and those who want Algerian independence;. After Philippeville, the Algerian population can no longer sit on the fence. Philippeville is when the civil war proper begins. And it is the worst kind of war - a civil war of attrition. Everyone must pick sides.


Unsurprisingly, FLN membership rises sharply after Philippeville.

 

The next turning point occurs in 1957, a year after FLN’s leadership establishes the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA), a policy-making body with 34 members and a 5-man executive. CNRA meets in Cairo and Tripoli, but one day its most moderate leaders, who are based in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, including future president Ahmed Ben Bella are arrested after their plane is intercepted by the French air force and forced to land in Algiers. The incident convinces FLN hardliners within Algeria the French are not interested in negotiation; FLN no longer sees any alternative to armed struggle.

 

As hostilities escalate, the French predctably label Algerians savages, while French-Algerians are given official permission to arm themselves. Mistrust turns into outright hatred and skirmishes give way to open warfare.


The French army massively steps up its presence in Algeria. The new arrivals at first take heavy losses, because they are poorly prepared for FLN’s guerrilla-style warfare, but soon the French commanders are replaced with experienced officers from the war in Indochina.

 

Between 1956 and 1957, the Battle of Algiers – a protracted campaign of urban guerrilla warfare – rages in the Casbah, which is a tightly-clustered FLN strong-hold in the heart of Algiers. The Casbah is repeatedly bombed and FLN responds by bombing predominantly pro-French parts of Algiers. A general strike paralyses the city.

Images from the Casbah in Algiers (Source: Own photos)


The Battle of Algiers is remembered for France’s barbarism and ruthlessness. With almost unfathomable cruelty, the French arrest and torture 80,000 Algerians, including 30-40% of the population of the Casbah. The French also use rape systematically to humiliate and terrorise the female population in Algiers (see here). There are summary executions and 3,000 Algerians are ‘disappeared’. Eventually, FLN activity in the Casbah declines, although it does not die out completely.

Ourida Meddad, the first female martyr from the Casbah in Algiers (Source: Own photo)

 

The French public (in France) is not unaware of what is happening in Algiers and sympathy with the French army is declining rapidly on account of the widespread use of torture, rape, collective punishment, and indiscriminate killing.


The antagonism in France does not go unnoticed by French-Algerians and Algeria-based units of the French army either. Adversity strengthens their bond to the point they become a de facto independent political force. French troops in Algeria number 470,000 at this time, including the French Foreign Legion. Rather than moderate their approach, French-Algerians and the French army instead extend the same brutal methods they used in the Casbah to rooting out FLN fighters in the rest of Algeria.

 

Predictably, the humanitarian toll is enormous. French forces indiscriminately bomb entire villages on the mere suspicion of sheltering FLN guerrillas. Two million Algerians are forced to re-locate into concentration camp-like settlements.


My guide in Algiers, an effusive and highly intelligent hijab-wearing young woman with a Master’s Degree in linguistics, tells me what happened to her grandfather, who lived in a small village in a state neighbouring Algiers.

 

One evening”, she narrates, “my grandfather, who was an old man and poor and not involved in politics at all had to go outside during curfew due to a stomach upset [the houses of poor Algerian peasants did not have inside toilets]. He was spotted by French troops, arrested, and brought to their headquarters. They tortured him for three days. Neighbours were also picked up and tortured. Eventually, they convinced themselves he had no links to FLN and released him, but he was bleeding so much inside that he died of his internal injuries within a month.

 

The French army and French-Algerians kill an estimated 1.5 million Algerians between 1954 and 1962, prompting Regis Debray in write in his then-famous book ‘Revolucion en la Revolucion? ‘: “You will kill 10 of ours. We will only kill one of yours. But we will wear you down and we wil win" (Source: here)

Ali La Pointe, an important martyr from the Casbah (Source: Own photo)


By 1958, sympathy for Algerian freedom fighters in France is becoming so overwhelming that it is only a question of time before French policy towards Algeria must change.  Reading the tea leaves, FLN forms a provisional government in Tunis in anticipation of independence and other countries start to recognise FLN as the legitimate future government of Algeria.

 

The French army in Algeria panics and takes power from the civilian French administration in Algiers. The army also seizes Corsica and threatens to move on Paris. A key demand of the military is that Charles de Gaulle is returned to power in France; they hope he will take the French-Algerian side, given his involvement with Algeria during his time as leader of the Free French.

 

The Algerian coup collapses the French Fourth Republic, enabling de Gaulle, now President, to rewrite the constitution. He assigns more power to himself, but rather than double down on French involvement in Algeria as French-Algerians had hoped he would do, de Gaulle instead proposes to make Algeria an ‘associate’ of France, i.e. no longer an integral part of the motherland. He also puts forward proposals to give the same rights to Algerians as those enjoyed by French-Algerians.

 

Such ideas do not cut the mustard with the French-Algerians, whose hatred and mistrust of Algerians now run so deep they can only think of killing and torture. FLN also rejects de Gaulle’s proposal, because by now FLN wants no association with France at all. Since de Gaulle’s political future ultimately depends more on what the French in France think than what the French in Algeria think he begins to air ideas of independence for Algeria for the first time.

 

This prompts the French-Algerians to threaten to break ties with France altogether, in turn forcing de Gaulle to arrest the French-Algerian leaders and announce plans for a referendum on Algerian self-determination, which is to be held on 8 January 1961.

 

With the clock ticking and their leaders in jail, the French-Algerians form the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), an underground organisation, which immediately begins to launch terror attacks both in France and Algeria.

 

The January 1961 referendum delivers a decisive 75% majority in favour of self-determination. Hoping to forestall the independence, which will inevitably follow, elements of the French army in Algeria and French-Algerians stage a last-ditch coup d’etat in Algiers on 21 April 1961. The French Foreign Legion sides with the coup mongers, in effect splitting the French armed forces, but in the end the bulk of the French army sides with Paris. After de Gaulle condemns the so-called ‘Generals’ Putsch’, the coup attempt ends in failure on 26 April.

 

Independence talks begin in May 1961. A ceasefire is agreed between OAS and FLN in June 1961, although OAS continues its bombing campaign. FLN offers no retaliation, so as not to jeopardise the independence process.

 

When independence talks begin, France demands control of southern Algeria, which has oil and the two nuclear test sites, Reggan and In Eker. However, FLN insists that Algeria cannot be split. France must make do with commitments from FLN that it can continue to access Algerian oil, the nuclear test sites, and a naval base.


The Evian Accords of February 1962 draw up the final terms for full independence in exchange for which Algeria promises three years of safe conduct for French-Algerians after which they must either become resident aliens or citizens. Independence is approved in a referendum on 1 July 1962. Six million Algerians vote in favour, only 16,534 vote against as French-Algerians boycott the vote.


On 5 July 1962, Algeria becomes an independent nation.


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Upwards of 900,000 French-Algerians and all of Algeria’s jews leave after independence. Harkis, Algerians who served as auxiliaries with the French army, are murdered in large numbers by the FLN or by lynch mobs, often after torture. Some 20,000 Harkis families (around 90,000 people) manage to flee to France, some with help from French officers acting against orders. Today, they and their descendants form a significant part of the Algerian population in France.

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Throughout its post-independence history, Algeria has struggled to escape the colonial legacy of violence, authoritarian control, and political exploitation of ideology and religion. The curse of oil has exacerbated the problems. Governance in post-independence Algeria has assumed very distinct characteristics, which I will now outline, many of which clearly link back to the colonial period.

 

The first characteristic is authoritarianism. After independence, FLN is the sole political actor with any legitimacy, so it easily steps into the authoritarian power structures left behind by the French. In 1963, FLN under President Ahmed Ben Bella changes the constitution to transfer all executive power to the office of the president. FLN also introduces a one-party system, which effectively neutralises political competition. A strong alliance between the president, the army, and FLN is established, which remains to this day.

 

The second theme is state control of key industries. In 1965, Houari Boumédiène overthrows Ben Bella and remains in power until his death in 1978. Boumédiène concentrates even more power into presidency, this time at the expense of the party, and extends government control over key industries. He collectivises agriculture and nationalises the oil industry, establishing Sonatrach, the national oil company, which controls the entire oil and gas industry, including exploration, extraction, refining, and marketing.

 

The nationalisation of oil and gas is crucially important, because oil money is key to maintaining the government’s power. Algeria produces 1.7m barrels of oil, making it the 17th largest oil producer in the world. Algeria also has some 159 bn cubic feet of natural gas reserves (11th largest in the world). Altogether, hydrocarbon revenues contribute 60% of total government revenue and account for 30% of GDP.


The oil money buys loyalty by creating jobs, directing investments, and paying the army. With its hands on such a large resource, the Algerian government becomes almost untouchable, except during periods of dramatic declines in the price of oil.

 

Indeed, the precipitous drop in oil prices in 1986 poses a major threat to the entire governance structure in Algeria. Oil accounts for 90% of Algeria’s exports - a percentage made higher by the fact that tourism is generally discouraged - so in 1986 external revenues drop by a whopping 55 per cent in a single year, triggering an acute crisis with high unemployment, soaring inflation, and widespread shortages. By October 1988, the government is forced to introduce reforms. A new constitution reinstates multiparty democracy, but this has the unforeseen consequence that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) gets a shot at power. FIS goes on to win the first two rounds of the 1991 election and Bendjedid resigns.

The 1986 collapse in the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil (Source: here)


At this moment, Algeria finds itself at an important fork in the road. Algeria’s newly elected president, Mohamed Boudiaf, attempts to remove senior military brass and introduce genuine economic reforms, including a move away from the oil state-socialist economic model towards a more diversified market-driven economy.


But in June 1992 Boudiaf is assassinated after just 4 months in office.  Many speculate that, had Boudiaf been allowed to rule, he could have ended the destructive influence of what by now is called Le Pouvoir – the shady elite pulling the strings in Algeria. They even think Boudiaf may have prevented the Algerian Civil War, because his political reforms, it is argued, would have introduced genuine political competition and therefore taken away support from FIS.

 

But it is not to be. Instead, a FLN-backed military junta led by Houari Boumédiène takes power and bans FIS, triggering the bloody Algerian Civil War of 1992-2002. This development illustrates the third feature of Algerian governance, namely the prominent role of the military. Boumédiène is an army officer before the coup. As president, he uses oil revenues to buy loyalty from the military, which also has close ties to FLN dating back to the independence war. As reward for supporting the president, the military gets a budget of 4.3% of GDP, the highest in Africa. When Boumediène dies in 1978, it is the military that choses his successor, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, who runs the country until 1992 with a tight inner circle of senior military advisors.


Le Pouvoir and the military are as much to blame for the civil war as the FIS. In fact, the civil war is a tragedy in every possible sense. Algerians have never showed signs of sustained popular backing for political Islam. FIS's political rise is merely a protest vote resulting from the government’s repression of legitimate political opposition in Algeria. The bloody conflict that ensues pits two groups pursuing very narrow self-interest aganst each other, but it is ordinary Algerians, who are caught in the cross-fire and pay the price. The war claims more than 150,000 lives. In the end, Le Pouvoir wins and extends its hold on power.

 

Abdelaziz Bouteflika wins the election of 1998 after other candidates withdraw due to election-rigging by the military. Once elected, Bouteflika resumes political repression, strengthening the elite oligarchy, and engaging in rampant corruption to pay off the opposition. Bouteflika also removes the two-term limit and eventually holds the presidency for four consecutive terms.

 

The fourth feature of Algerian politics is religion. It is ironic that FLN, which once used the religion in the war against the French ends up fighting a bloody war against political Islam. Yet, this is exactly what happens. FLN's about-turn on Islam illustrates how readily religious people lend themselves to political exploitation and the immorality of politicians who exploit this vulnerability.


FLN views FIS and political Islam as threats, because they are the only credible way for ordinary Algerians to express discontentment with the FLN government, just as FLN was once the only way to express discontent with France.


That is not to say that Algeria’s post-independence governments are completely opposed to religion, far from it. However, they consistently clamp down hard whenever religion becomes mixed up with politics. In fact, Algeria has the second-largest mosque in Africa precsely because the government is keen to be seen to be a good Muslim. As for Algeria’s brand of mainly Sunni Islam, it is tolerant, much like in Turkey. Women are educated and have all the same rights as men, for example. Women are also not required to cover up, although many choose to do so.

Djamaa el Djazaïr mosque in Algiers, Africa's second largest (Source: Own photo)


Closely linked to religion, martyrdom is another important feature of Algerian politics. Algiers is replete with references to the martyrs of the independence war. As mentioner earlier, you see them in street murals, statues, names of streets and squares, in museums, and as giant monuments. The constant reminders of the sacrifices made against the French help to sustain a narrative about a country under siege in a hostile world. The purpose, of course, is to instill the message that Algeria needs a strong FLN to protect them and the country from its enemies.

The Martyr's Monument in Algiers (Source: Own photo)

 

A sixth theme is isolationism. Closely related to martyrdom, the recurring myths of the foreign threats help the government to justify tight restrictions on travel into and out of Algeria. The closure of Algeria to the outside world in turn helps to keep out information, which makes it easier to quell new ideas and calls for change. Like in the former Soviet Union, the government offers stability and safety, but behind a very high wall.


The importance of isolationism to the government's survival is best illustrated by the events that take place during and after the Arab Spring of early 2011, when Le Pouvoir is once again forced to grant concessions. Bouteflika lifts the state of emergency, which has been in place for nineteen years, but it is not enough. He is forced to step down in 2019 during the Hirak mass protests, Algeria’s so-called Revolution of Smiles. Bouteflika’s presidency becomes untenable, because he loses the backing of the military. To this day, the military maintains its power and wields undiminished influence behind the scenes under Bouteflika’s successor, current presdent Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

 

Related to the theme of isolationism, the Algerian government makes political hay from France’s dodgy nuclear tests at the Reggane and In Eker near the Hoggar Mountains. In one of the tests, in 1960, nine French soldiers of the 621st Groupe d'Armes Spéciales suffer heavy radioactive contamination, but whole villages are also within the fallout zones and they are never informed about the accident. Illnesses, such as thyroid, breast, and skin cancers, orthopaedic disorders, and deformities are now common and seemingly being transferred down generations. France has never decontaminated the site, which contains a lot of lightly buried but highly radioactive material, including tanks and artillery.

 

The final feature of Algerian politics is institutional capture, corruption, and cronyism. The purpose of the parliament in Algeria is not really to serve the people. Rather, it shelters business people and politicians who need immunity from prosecution, or it is used as a springboard for better access to rent-seeking opportunities within the government apparatus. The judiciary is susceptible to pressure from the civilian government and the military. Courts often operate as political instruments to discourage popular protest. There is not full press freedom. Anticorruption investigations are means of settling scores between factions within the regime rather than fighting graft. In this twisted environment, cronyism emerges as a big problem for the private sector, because business people whose views do not align with the regime often face harassment by the authorities. This makes Algeria one of the most difficult environments in the world to establish and operate a private business.


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A final thought. As I discussed at some length in a recent blog on India (see here), certain key conditions have to be satisfied for countries to achieve sustainable freedom and prosperity. The most important of these is to come to terms with predatory economic and political elites.


Algeria’s post-independence experience suggests Algeria will only be able to develop in an inclusve manner if oil prices fall sharply and remain low, because only then will the rents from oil that keep Le Pouvoir in power come to an end. In a future blog, I shall take a closer look at the future for oil prices in light of rapid advances in renewable energy and battery technology.

 

Of course, unlike many other oil producers, Algeria is likely to have a starring role in a future dominated by solar energy. Algeria is Africa’s largest country with an area of 2,800 million square kilometres and a staggering 80% of the Sahara desert lies within its borders….it is intriguing to think how solar power may therefore one day save Algeria if oil has its day, albeit only if the government keeps well clear of the solar business.

 

The End

 

 

 

 

 

 

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